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7 October 1968  
CS/HPM-18

MEMORANDUM FOR : All CS Historical Officers and  
Writers of CS History

SUBJECT : Security of CS Historical Papers


REFERENCES : A. CSHB 5-13-1, 1 February 1966  
B. CSI 5-13, 9 August 1967

RESCISION : CS/HPM-3, 11 October 1967

1. This rescinds CS/HPM-3, 11 October 1967: Security of CS Historical Papers. Revised procedures based on our experience of the past year are outlined below.

2. Because each CS history is a uniquely sensitive non-compartmented story of an element or activity of the Clandestine Services, we must be constantly concerned with the security of the paper and its contents as well as with its usefulness as an historical document. The security risks inherent in pulling together such an articulated story must be recognized, considered, and controlled from the time a paper is started. The measures for insuring the security of historical papers involve: (1) safeguarding source documents, the paper during preparation, and the completed history; (b) controlling the distribution of readership of the

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paper; and (c) further protecting highly sensitive content through the use of cryptic references or other security devices, as judged necessary by the responsible CS component.

3. Custody and Safeguards

Uniform procedures for the custody and safeguarding of CS historical papers have been established. The completed paper, classified SECRET or higher if necessary, is produced in an original and one copy only. The original is held in the custody of the chief of the responsible CS headquarters component or his designated representative, and the single Xerox copy is held in the DDP vault. Completed histories or drafts are never transmitted outside the CIA headquarters area. (Special procedures for transporting historical papers between the Headquarters Building and the Historical Staff offices in the Key Building are set forth in HPM-15, 15 August 1968.) All working drafts or extra copies are destroyed upon completion of the paper, and all sensitive source documents used in preparation of the paper are returned to the files from which they were drawn, or destroyed if they are extra copies.

4. Controls

The officer responsible for custody of a CS historical paper insures that the paper (or any portion of it) is

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issued only on a need-to-know basis. He must know at all times who has the paper and where it is located. He maintains necessary logs and records, and provides the annual report required by paragraph 3c (11) of Reference B. (The procedures for controlling and accounting for the use of historical papers are set forth in CS/HPM-2, 6 October 1967 and CS/HPM-7, 6 November 1967.) To facilitate the use of one section of a paper by a person who does not need to know its total content, the histories are bound with a plastic spiral binder which permits easy copying of pages to be issued to the reader. Procedures for controlling such portions of a paper are the same as for the document as a whole.

5. Protection of Sensitive Content

It would be unnecessary and undesirable to use cryptic references or compartmentation procedures for any portion of a CS history, if controls on distribution were so restrictive that the paper could be seen only by the DDP. But if a CS historical paper is to be of maximum usefulness, it must be available (within security limitations) to all CS officers who have a legitimate need for the information it contains. In many instances officers can profit from the reading of a CS history without knowing the true identities

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of the most sensitive assets or all details of the most sensitive operations which may be discussed in the paper. With a view to making historical papers available to a wider readership, the Historical Officer should determine which identities or details (if any) are of such continuing sensitivity that they must be encrypted or compartmented from the basic paper, or omitted entirely. When making this determination, the Historical Officer and the responsible component officers should take into consideration the special safeguards and controls applied to all CS historical papers. They should avoid making the basic paper meaningless or unreadable through the needless use of cryptic references for relatively nonsensitive matters.

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Guidelines. [REDACTED] Chapter III, 1f states:

"Cryptonyms should be used to designate sensitive operations, agents, and organizations..." Of course, all CS operations and clandestine assets are sensitive, but not all are of such sensitivity that they must be excluded from a document so tightly controlled as are the CS historical papers. Obviously, no exact rule can be made on where to draw the line as to what true identities and details should or should not be included in the basic history. The sensitivity of the subject matter in each individual paper must be considered separately.

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However, there are a few general guidelines for the use of true names and cryptonyms:

a. Generally, true names are used for: (1) CS components and staff officers at Headquarters and in the field; (2) foreign intelligence and security services and their key officers with whom official liaison is maintained; (3) key political leaders or other prominent foreign personalities (unless a sensitive clandestine relationship is involved); (4) unwitting persons; (5) individuals, organizations, and installations against which operations are targeted.

b. When considered essential to security by the CS component responsible for the activity described, cryptonyms and/or non-pinpointing descriptions are used for: (1) recruited agents, cover organizations, and other clandestine assets of continuing sensitivity; (2) staff agents under deep cover; (3) target installations of unusual sensitivity.


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6. Responsibility of Historical Officers

Historical Officers have the same responsibilities as releasing officers. When the HO has completed his work on the draft of a CS historical paper (Step 7 of Flow Chart, CS/HPM-10), he signs the cover sheet routing it to the CSHB editors, and by his signature certifies that the paper is consistent with operational and security considerations pertinent to the subject matter.

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Executive Secretary  
CS Historical Board

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